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The classical mortgage of the common law takes the form of an
absolute conveyance of the mortgaged property, with a defeasance
clause providing that upon payment of the mortgage debt on the due
date the property is to revert back to the mortgagor.1 This form of
mortgage goes back, at least, to the 12th century, and, contrary to the
prevailing view, was certainly in general use by the middle of the 13th
century.2 Originally, the transaction would take the form of two separate instruments, one an absolute charter of feoffment, and the other
t B. S, x929, Columbia University; M. A., 1931, LL.B., 937, New York University. Member of the New York Bar. On the legal staff of The Department of Investigation, City of New York. Author: A Note on the Jewish Execution in Medieval
Gcmnany, JEWIsH SOCIAL STUDIES, vol. V, No. 3; Evasions of the Usury Laws in the
Middle Ages, to be published in the HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEw; The Brondeis
Method in Constitutional Law, BITZARON (a Hebrew publication), vol. V, No. 2.
1. 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (2d ed. 1898) =2-x23.
2. Hazeltine has traced it only as far back as 1230, to p. 458 in BRacrou's NorrZ
BooK. See his Gage of Land in Medieval England (1904) 17 HARe.L Ray. 549, 537,
n. I. POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, loc. Cit. supra note I, apparently place its beginning
after the 13th century, although in a note they say: "It is very possible that this form.
of gage, the conditional feoffment, had been in use from an early time, but that tek-f-writers found little to say of it; because it fell under the general doctrine of conditional
gifts." But these great historians of English law apparently overlooked the fact that
this type of mortgage underwent two distinct stages of development, and that the first
stage, in which two instruments were used, reaches as far back as the time of Henry
II. No. 5o9 in MAvox, FORtMULARE ANGLICANUM (temp. Henry II) clearly represents a transaction of this type. It is an agreement between mortgagor and mortgagee
that within 2% years from the date of the instrument the mortgagor or his brothers
or nephew may redeem the property, and that upon their failure to do so the property
is to remain to the mortgagee in accordance with his charter. "Et nisi poterimus ad
istud' terminum terrain illam emere, teneat praedictus Toma . . . sicut carta sua
testatur.

.

.

."

Obviously, two instruments, a charter of feoffment and an agreement

of repurchase, were used in this transaction. What the writer cannot understand Is
that Pollock and Maitland cite this instrument as an instance of what they call the
"Bractonian mortgage," under which a term of years was turned into a fee upon the
mortgagor's failure to pay the mortgage debt. The above quotation from the instrument shows beyond any doubt that a charter of feoffment was delivered to the mortgagee, or perhaps, to a third party, simultaneously with, or prior to, the execution of
that instrument.
3 HOLDSWORTH, A HIsoRY OF ENGLISH LAW (3d ed. 1923) t3o, referring to the
classical English mortgage, says: "It gained in popularity from the 14th century onwards." And in note 3 he adds: "This fact can be illustrated from the forms of conveyance printed in Madox Form. In 1255 (No. 230) we have a mortgage of the
older type made by a lease for fifteen years. In Edw. III's reign the custom seems to
have been to employ two deeds. . .. In 1401 only one deed is used, and the condition is indorsed on the deed.

.

.

.

ig Hy. VI we get a mortgage in modern form."

But the cases cited in note 3 infra, show that this type of mortgage was prevalent in
the 13th century, and that the custom of employing two deeds goes well beyond the
reign of Edw. IIl. Indeed, there is almost contemporary testimony to the prevalence
of the classical English mortgage in the i3th century. In Rye v. Tumby, 8 Edw. II,
36, 38, which was a case involving a mortgage in the form of two separate instruments,
there is the following statement: "In past times men were often wont to make such
covenants and conditions:'

(179)
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providing for a defeasance of the conveyance upon payment of the
mortgage debt.3 Later on it became customary to include both, conveyance and defeasance, in the same instrument. 4 In the earlier stage
of the development of this form of mortgage the charter of feoffment
and the instrument of defeasance were usually delivered to a third party,
"in equal hand," to be turned over to the lender in case of non-payment of the mortgage debt on the due date, or to be returned to the
borrower in case of payment. This last feature of the early develop-.
ment of the classical English mortgage has been entirely overlooked
by writers on the subject, although it appears quite frequently in entries
on the Close Rolls during the latter part of the reign of Henry III
and during the reign of Edward I.
The origin of this obviously artificial device, which does iot correspond either to the true economic significance of the transaction or
to the intention of the parties, has never been satisfactorily explained.
Nor is the reason for it quite apparent. Why should a mortgage,
given to secure a debt, take the form of an immediate and absolute
conveyance of the mortgaged property, when what is intended is a
forfeiture of the property to take effect in the future in the -case of
non-payment of the mortgage debt?
3. MADOX, FORMULARE (ca. 1248) No. 631; Calendar of The Close Rolls, t26t1264, pp. 3IO-3II; 1264-1268, pp. 1O5, 385-386, 391-392, 525; 1272-1279, pp. 332, 413,
415, 421, 428.
4. MADox, FORMULARE (1401) No. 579. The defeasance is indorsed on the back
of the charter of feoffment. In (1448) No. 589 the defeasance clause is on the face of
the charter,as in our modern mortgage.
5. In all of the entries cited in note 3 supra, from Close Rolls, 126t-1264 and
i264-1268, as well as in those at pp. 421 and 428 of 1272-1279, the "equal hand" is
specifically mentioned. In the three other entries there is no mention of a deposit with
a third party, but this does not necessarily mean that there was no such deposit
in these cases. See also Y. B. 21 & 22 Fdw. I, p. 222, and Rye v. Tumby, note 2 supra.
In the former case, which was an action of novel disseisin, the defendant's answer is
recorded'as follows: "B came and said that he (Adam) could not have an action; for
the reason that Adam had pledged the said tenements to him for 401 to be paid on two
certan days, Viz., 201 -on such a day, and the other 2of at such a day; and that, if he
failed in payment at the days fixed, the land should remain to B and his heirs in fee;
and that in pursuance thereof he made a charter of feoffment, which was deposited
% ith an umpire, to be delivered to him to whom it ought to be delivered after the days
were passed. . .
Reference to a conditional conveyance, probably by way of security for a loan, in
which the instruments were delivered to a third party, is also contained in the following entry on the Pipe Rolls: "Prior de Kenillewurda debet c. s. pro habendo judicio
de Flechamsteda secundum cartas suas quas Templarii tenent." Pipe Roll Society
Pub]. V. 2 (x. S.), p. 128 (1191). The treasury of the Templars was often used as
the depositary, the "equal hand," in such conditional conveyances by way of security
for loans. In the document cited above from Close Rolls, 1264-I268, pp. 385-386, 39t392, there is the following recital: "Carta vero feoffamenti quam idem . . . habet
de dicto . . . super dictis maneriis in equali manu de consensu partium ad Novum
Templum Lond' liberetur." A similar recital is also contained in Close Rolls, 12611264. pp. 310-311. See also Calendar of the Charter Rolls, v. 1, pp. 72 (1228), 73
(1228), 438 (1255), and Calendar of The Plea Rolls of The .Exchequer of The Jews,
v. 3. pp. 283-284, for references to deposits with the Templars of cash and documents
in conditional transactions of various kinds.
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This strange form of the common law mortgage becomes still
more puzzling when we compare its pattern with that of the conditional
or penal bond and find a striking similarity between them. The conditional bond contains in itself the same logical twist as that involved
in the common law mortgage. Instead of the conditional obligation
it is intended to be, with the obligation emerging upon the happening
of a certain contingency, it takes the form of an absolute obligation
which is to become void in case of the non-occurrence of the contingency upon which the obligation is made to depend.
As far as the writer is aware no one has ever called attention to
this similarity of pattern between the mortgage and the conditional
bond. Yet it is exaftly this similarity which has led the writer to what
he believes to be the clue to the whole situation. For, upon investigation, it appears that not only is the conditional bond, in the form in
which it has come down to us, similar in pattern to the mortgage, but
that its course of development has also been the same as that of the
mortgage.
The writer believes that both of these legal devices were introduced by the Jews who, during the i2th and a good part of the i3th
centuries, occupied in England the position of principal financiers and
money-lenders, 7 and that these devices were adopted and copied by Englishmen when they learned the business of money-lending from the Jew.
For many centuries before their settlement in England the Jews
had cultivated the study of the law with great devotion and religious
fervor. "Dine mamonoth," i. e. that branch of the law which deals
with matters relating to property, contracts and torts, as distinguished
from ritual law, was particularly favored by men of acute intellect
among them. "He who wishes to acquire wisdom should study dine
mamonoth," says an early Talmudic text.' Throughout the lands of
their dispersion justice was administered among them by -rabbinical
courts in accordance with Talmudic law, as interpreted by the leading
rabbis.9 As a result of those centuries of study and practice there
developed among them a body of law, and with it a large number
of legal forms and devices, far more mature and complex than anything that was known to English lawyers of the i2th century. Under
these circumstances it would be very strange indeed if we did not find
the Jews in England using, in their transactions with their Christian
6. See

2

BL. CoMm. *340.

7. See I POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 1, 469.
8. Baba Bathra, fol. 175b.
9.See FINKELSTEIN, JEWISH SELF-GovERNMENT IN THE

MIDDLE AGES (1924)
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neighbors, the devices with which they were familiar, and which were
elaborately discussed in their legal literature.
That so little attention has been given to the possible influence
of the Jews upon the development of security devices in England, a
field in which their influence should have made itself felt more than
in any other branch of the law, is probably due to the fact that most
of the sources of Jewish law are not available in English, and even
where available it takes years of study to master their intricacies.
Pollock and Maitland, in discussing the possible influence of the
Jews upon the development of English law, have this to say:
"Whether the sojourn of the Jews in England left any permanent mark upon the body of our law is a question that we dare
not debate, though we may raise it. We can hardly suppose that
from the Lex Judaica, the Hebrew law which the Jews administered among themselves, anything passed into the code of the
contemptuous Christians. But that the international Lex Judaismi
perished in 1290 without leaving any memorial of itself is by no
means certain." 10

While it may be conceded that cases of deliberate and conscious
adoption by English lawyers of rules and doctrines from Hebrew law
were rare, although this is by no-means certain, the adoption of security devices is an entirely different matter. The origin of these devices is extrajudicial; they are born of the exigencies of trade and
commerce, where Jew meets Gentile on more or less equal terms, and
where religious prejudices are shoved into the background. The judiciary only passes upon their effect and validity, and is only in a limited
sense a party to their creation.
In order to trace the origin of the two devices under discussion it
will be necessary for the writer to make a little excursus into Talmudic
law. There is in Talmudic law a certain doctrine, very vaguely stated,
which has given rise to a whole literature in post-Talmudic Hebrew
lore. This doctrine is known as "asmakhta" and relates to conditional conveyances and obligations. In a terse phrase, characteristic
of the Talmud, the rule is laid down that "asmakhta" is not valid. But
what "asmakhta" is, that is, wherein its flaw consists, is a matter of
lively dispute among post-Talmudic Hebrew authorities. Various
theories have been offered as to the nature of "asmakhta," and as to
the reason for its ineffectiveness. These will be discussed later. But
in order to introduce the reader to the subject several concrete cases
10. 1 POLLOCK AND MAIrAND, op. Cit. supra note z, at 475.
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in which the doctrine is said to be applicable will be cited here from
the Talmud.
A and B enter into a purchase and sale agreement, and A, the
buyer, hands B, the seller, earnest money. They stipulate that in case
of a breach by A his earnest money shall be forfeited, and in case of
a breach by B he is to return to A double the amount of the earnest
money. Rabbi Jose says: the agreement is binding. Rabbi Judah

says: the agreement is not binding. Such is the substance of an early
text, quoted in the Babylonian Talmud. In discussing this text the
Talmud classifies the transaction as an "asmakhta," and says that
Rabbi Jose holds that "asmakhta" is valid, while Rabbi Judah holds
that it is not valid.11
A loans money to B on the security of a field, and A says to B:
"If you do not repay the loan within 3 years, the field shall be mine."

The field is A's, if the loan is not repaid within the time agreed upon.
This, again, is the substance of an early text, which is followed by an
elaborate discussion in the Babylonian Talmud. 12 The conclusion of
the Talmud is that B's stipulation, upon its face, is an "asmakhta," and

that therefore it ought not to be binding. In order to reconcile this
text with their view of "asmakhta" the Talmudists assert that the text
*has reference to a case where B said to A "kni meakhshav," that is,
acquire from now. As to the exact meaning of the cryptic phrase "kni
meakhshav" opinions vary among post-Talmudic authorities. Rashi,
the famous i ith century commentator of the Talmud, holds that the
phrase means an actual present sale of the property with an option to
repurchase, while others hold that the mere inclusion of! the phrase
"from now" in the forfeiture formula saves the transaction from the
infirmity of "asmakhta."
A, the owner of a field, leased the field to B under a cropsharing
agreement, and B let the field lie fallow. B must pay to A the value
of his share of the crops which the field would have produced had it
been cultivated. To this the Talmud adds that if B had stipulated to
pay a thousand "zuz" in case of his failure to cultivate, and that is an
amount in excess of the actual loss to A, the stipulation would not have
been binding because of "'asmakhta." Is
A paid part of a debt he owed to B. They deposited the bond
with a third party under an agreement by the terms of which the third
party was to return the bond to B, enabling him to recover the full
amount named therein, if A should fail to pay the balance of the debt
i. Baba Metzia, fol. 48b.
Id. at fol. 65b et seq.
T3. Id. at fol. io4a-io4b.

12.
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within a specified time. Rabbi Jose says: the agreement is valid.
Rabbi Judah says: it is not valid. Here again the reason given by
the Talmud for Rabbi Judah's holding is "asmakhta." 14
Finally, A deposited with the court the documents upon which
his case rested, agreeing that if he did not appear again within a certain time, these should be null and void. This agreement is binding.
although it is an "asmakhta," but only when made before a prominent
court, and where A's failure to appear is not due to unavoidable circumstances. 5 It should be added here that there is an important body
of opinion holding that the rule in- this case is one of procedure, and
that it applies only to stipulations made in court in connection with the
conduct of a trial.1 6
These are the main cases, dealing with "asmakhta," which are mentioned in the Talmud. Among post-Talmudic Hebrew authorities two
major trends of thought are discernible with regard to this doctrine.
One, represented by Rav Hai Gaon '" and Maimonides,' 8 is that the
flaw of "asmakhta" consists in the futurity of the conveyance or of the
emergence of the obligation. According to these authorities a conveyance or an obligation in order to be valid must take effect immediately
upon the performance of the act in law which is to give rise to it. If
a conveyance is made or an obligation assumed to take effect in the
future upon the happening of a contingency which is to occur after the
act in law is performed, the conveyance or the obligation is not valid.
In other words, a conditional transaction is valid only when the condition is subsequent, and not when it is precedent.
The other trend of thought, represented by Rashi, 19 Ri, 20 and
Rabbi Solomon ben Adreth,"- is that the flaw of "asmakhta" consists
14. Baba Bathra, fol.

i68a.

is. Nedarim, fol. 27a-27b.
16. Rif (Rabbi Isaac Alfassi) on Baba Bathra, ch. io.
j7. Mekach Umemkar, ch. 17 (Vienna, 18io).
I8. Yad Ilachazakah (Code of Hebrew Law), Mekhirah, ch. ix, sec. x8.
19.

Commentary on Baba Metzia, 48b, s. v. Asmakhta kanya.

20. Tosaphoth on Baba Metzia, 66a, s. v. Uminyomi.
21. Responsa of Rabbi Solomon ben Adreth, No. 933 (Lemberg, 1811).

This
theory of the nature of "asmakhta" finds confirmation in the light of modern research,
which has revealed that throughout the ancient Orient penalty clauses were generally
incorporated in agreements of every kind and description. See BLAU, MONATSSCHRIFT
F'R DIE WISSENSCHAFT DES JUDENTUMS, vol. 69, p. 139 f. Blau was first to call attention to the connection between the doctrine of "asmakhta" and the penalty clauses in
Assyro-Babylonian deeds. But his assertion that the doctrine is confined to the Babylonian Talmud, and that it was unknown among the Jews of Palestine is obviously
incorrect, since it is definitely mentioned in the Palestinian Talmud under the name
"izzumim". See LiEBERMANv, GREEK IN JEWISH PALESTINE (1942) 4, and authorities
there cited. See also Palestinian Talmud, Baba Bathra, c. io, sec. 5.
Viewed in this light the cryptic statement in the Babylonian Talmud, Baba Metzia,
fol. 66b, that "every if is not valid" becomes intelligible. The word "if" in this statement
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in the fact that the conveyance is made, or the obligation assumed, as
a penalty for the non-compliance with an undertaking to which it is collateral. There is lacking, according to these authorities, that finality
of determination which is requisite for the validity of an act in law,
since the intention of the party purporting to make the conveyance,
or to assume the obligation, is to fulfill his main undertaking, and not
to effect a transfer of his property, or an assumption of an obligation,
other than his main obligation. In the case of a mortgage with a forfeiture clause, for example, the intention of the mortgagor is to undertake to pay the mortgage debt, and not to effect a conveyance of his
property. The forfeiture clause is intended as a penalty for the nonpayment of the debt, and therefore it is not valid. Only where there
is a present sale of the property with an option of repurchase is the
transaction valid. The test for distinguishing between a true conditional sale and a mortgage is, accoid"g to Rashi, 22 the existence of

a debt. If the party receiving the money is bound to repay it, at the
option of the party parting with it, even after the time. fixedby the
agreement has expired, so that the risk of destruction and depreciation
of the property falls upon the former, the transaction is a mortgage,
and not a conveyance. But where the repayment of the money is
optional with the party receiving it, and the party parting with it bears
the risk of loss and depreciation, the transaction is a true conditional
sale. Sueh, in broad outline, is the doctrine of "asmakhta," as expounded by the leading authorities in Hebrew law.
Let us now see how all this bears upon our problem of the origin
of the English mortgage and the conditional bond. Malinonides in his
Code of Hebrew Law 23 cites the following device which was used by the
"sages of Spain" for the purpose of removing the flaw of "asmakhta"
from conditional obligations. The obligor would undertake an immediate and absolute obligation, and the oligee, on his part, would undertake to release the obligor upon the non-occurrence of the contingency
upon which the obligation was to depend. The doctrine of "ashmakhta"
not being applicable to releases and defeasances, this device accomplished the purpose of a conditional obligation in a legally valid manner by inverting the condition and attaching it to the release instead
is used as a terinus technicus, and the statement should be rendered in English as follows: "Every 'if' clause is not valid," that is every clause providing for a penalty, if
the main undertaking is not fulfilled, is not valid. See Beth Joseph on Tur Choshen
Mishpat, c. 2o7, sec. 18, for a discussion of the difficulty involved in this statement
when the word "if" is understood in its literal non-technical sense.
22. Commentary on Baba Metzia, 66b, s. v. Meakhshav knL

23. Loc. cit. supra note i8. See Sma on Choshen Mishpat, ch. 207, sec. 45, where
it is said that two separate undertakings, embodied in two separate instruments, are
necessary in order to remove from the transaction all appearance of "asmakhta."
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of the obligation. This device, in a slightly different form, is also
mentioned in a responsum by Rabbi Joseph Ibn Miggash,24
Maimonides' master.
From Maimonides' language it appears that the device described
by him had been in common use among the Spanish Jews long before
he wrote his code. Considering the leading position of the Spanish
rabbis of the time among the Jews of Europe, it is quite likely that this
device was adopted by the Jews of England and used by them in their
dealings among themselves and with their Christian neighbors. Indeed, there is direct proof that this device was used by the Jews of England as early as the latter part of the 12th century. A deed, dated
u183, recites that William of Tottenham acknowledges that he owes
a hundred marks of silver to Avigaia, the Jewess of London and Abraham, her son, at Martinmas, for which he undertook to pay them 13Y2
per cent interest. If at Christmas following he pays them 40 marks,
the remainder of the debt is to be reckoned at only 4o marks, on
which he is to pay them 25 per cent. And if he fails to pay the 4o
marks at Christmas, the debt is to remain a hundred marks. 25 Apparently, the amount of money actually loaned was 8o marks, and the
additional amount of 20 marks was intended as a penalty for nonpayment of the installment of 40 marks on the due date. This, it may
readily be seen, is the Maimonides device, adapted to the special circumstances of the transaction. The essential characteristic of that device, namely that what is intended as a penalty for the non-performance
of an undertaking appears as an absolute obligation with a condition
subsequent, is obviously present in this transaction.
At a somewhat later period, in the middle of the 13th century,
find
reference to this device in the responsa of Rabbi Solomon ben
we
Adreth, a leading authority of Barcelona, Spain. In one of these responsa 26 he discusses a case in which 2 bonds of iooo denarim each,
were deposited, one by each of 2 parties, with a third party, to be
delivered by the depositary to one of the parties in case of a breach
of certain conditions by the other. The question was raised whether
or not the transaction suffered from the flaw of "asmakhta." The
rabbi decided that it was entirely free from "asmakhta," adding that
such transactions were everyday occurrences, and that "the sages of
past generations did not refrain from holding such transactions valid."
In another responsum 27 by the same rabbi we find a case in which an
24. Responsa of Rabbi Joseph Ibn Miggash, No. 97 (Warsaw, i87o).
25. Rou.D, ANCIENT CHARTERS (Pipe Roll Society Publ. v. Io) 8t.
26. Responsa of Rabbi Solomon ben Adreth sub nomine Toldoth Adam, No. 242.
27. Id. at No. 33.
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instrument containing an absolute obligation, "without any condition
or reservation," together with a release containing a condition, was
delivered to a depositary, and again the question of "asmakhta" was
raised with similar result. A case similar in all respects to the case
first above cited from the responsa of Rabbi Solomon ben Adreth is
also discussed in the responsa of Rabbi Asher ben Yechiel 28 (12501328) with like result. Here, too, the remark is made by the rabbi
that "such transactions are everyday occurrences."
Turning to England again we find in the collection of Hebrew
Shtaroth (deeds) ,29 published by the Jewish Historical Society of England, a Norwich document, dated 1251 and embodying a transaction
between two Jews, in which it is stated that a bond, together with a
release, was delivered to a depositary, and that the depositary was to
deliver both instruments to one of the parties in case the other failed
to perform certain conditions.
In the i 3 th century this device was also used extensively by the
Jews of England in their transactions with non-Jews. There are numerous entries on the rolls of The Exchequer of The Jews showing the
use of this device. The following is a typical example: "Gilbert de
Pelham attached to answer to William de S. in a plea of detention of
a starr. The said William complains that whereas a starr, in which
it was contained that if he paid to Abraham son of Ben', a Jew, at
the feast of All Saints last past io marks, then he should be quit of a
debt of £20 in which he was bound to the said Jew, was handed over,
under his seal to Gilbert to be kept, the aforesaid Gilbert delivered it
to the said Jew fraudulently and maliciously, to Williams' damage of
£20." 30 It is to be noted here that in this case, as in most others of
this kind, the starr of acquittance was delivered to a third party, 'in
equal hand,' a procedure which, as we have seen above, was characteristic of such transactions among the Jews as well as of the classical
English mortgage in the earlier stage of its development.
28. Responsa of Rabbi Asher ben Yechiel, cl. 72, sec. 2.
29. DAVIs, HEBREW DEEDS (Shataroth) No. 22.
3o. Calendar of The Plea Rolls of The Exchequer of The Jews, v. 3, p. 83 (12x6).
See also v. 1, p. 149 (1268)-an acknowledgmenl by a Jewess that upon payment of.
12 marks 2 chirographs, one of 2o marks and another of 2 marks, are to be quit; pp. 162-

163-a starr to the effect that upon payment of 28s the debtor is to be quit ol a chirograph in the sum of ioos, was placed in "equal hand"; p. i68-"Defence, that it was
agreed between them that if Henry should pay Diai i8s at the Purification of Blessed
Mary in the 46th year, he should be quit of the chirograph of 4os"; p. 209--an acknowledgment by a Jew that upon payment of 16 a charter of £io is to be quit; pp.
3oo-3o-an agreement for the sale of timber: "And for the faithful performance of
the said agreement,

. . .

he, Michael, made the said Jew a charter for £20 and

caused it to be placed in the Cambridge Chirograph Chest, on condition, nevertheless,
that if he, Michael, should deliver the said timber to the said Jew at the terms aforesaid, then he should be quit of the said charter of £2o." For similar transactions see
v. i, pp. io, s8. 16r, 162-63, 189, 242i 306; v, 2, pp. 2, 4, 8, 30, 225, 293; V. 3, pp.
283-84, 297-99.
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As to transactions between non-Jews, we find in the 13th century
an occasional entry in the Close Rolls of a conditional obligation in
the form of two separate instruments, a recognizance and a defeasance
thereof.3" But alongside with these, and much more often, we find
provisions for penalties,-'? entirely undisguised, as well as provisions
that in case of default the obligor is to pay to the obligee his damages
and expenses, as to the amount of which the obligee is to be believed
on his simple word or, sometimes, on his oath.3" At the beginning
of the 14th century, 34 however, the conditional obligation in the form
of two separate instruments becomes more frequent, and by the middle of that century 35 it becomes the regular, and, apparently, the only
method of effecting a conditional obligation. As in the case of the conveyance with the condition subsequent, the conditional obligation continues for a long time to be incorporated in two separate instruments.
The single instrument, containing both the obligation and the defeasance, makes its appearance only at the beginning of the isth century, 36
31. Alan grants to John the wardship of certain manors. Alan agrees that if
John should be deprived of the wardship he would pay him £5o for every year he is so
deprived. In another instrument Join grants that if he should be deprived of the
%%ard.,hip, and Alan should pay him, "without plea or dispute," £24, together with damagcs and expenses, he would release Alan of the remainder. Calendar of The Close
Rolls, 1272-1279, pp. 123-24 (1274).
32. Id., 1268-72, pp. 292, 557-58.
33. Id.. 1254-56. pp. 378-79; 12-6-72, pp. 243, 292, 300, 4tO-11; 1272-79, pp. 254,
344. 355; MADOX. FORMULARE, No. 159 (1257). In an article on Evasions of The
Usury Laws in The Middle Ages, to be published in The lcar'ard Theological Ret4cw., the writer has shown that this device, too, is of Hebrew origin. Professor Maitland %%as apparently unaware of the licbrew origin of this device, lie thought it curious, and grouped it together with the device of making penal stipulations in favor of
some charity, a device which, as will be shown in note 37 infra. also originated with
the Jews, and which is of an entirely different nature than the damages and expenses
device. In his article, A Conv-eyance in the 13 th Century (:891) 7 L. Q. REv.
63, 6., Prof. Maitland says: "Very curious too are the manifold devices by which the
sin of usury is evaded, penal stipulations in favor of the relief of the Holy Land, or
in favor of the building of Westminster Abbey, and agreements to accept the creditor's unsworn estimate of the 'damages and costs' that he has been put to by being
kept out of his money." Now, while it is true that the damages and costs device was
used for the purpose of evading the usury laws, the same cannot be said of the stipulations in favor of some charity, since the creditor would never obtain the penalty
stipulated for. it being payable, in most cases, to the King for the use of the charity.
34. Calendar of The Close Rolls. 1302-1307, pp. 317, 4:0; 1307-13, p. 334; 1318-23,
pp. 330. 343, 350, 715, 724.
35. Id.. 134T-43. pp. 244, 277, 696; T349-54. pp. 23 S, 239, 244-45, 246-47, 392, 405,
477, .4S. 1354-60. pp. 67, 70, So.

36. The transition from two separate instruments to one single instrument may
be seen in the volume of the Calendar of The Close Rolls covering the years 13991402. At page 410 the trans.action appears in two separate entries, a recognizance and
a condition. and at pages 507. 5, recognizance and condition appear in the same entry.
The practice of incorporating the obligation and the defeasance in two separate instruments continued for some time, even after the single instrument became the usual form.
No. 151 in MADOx. for example, which is dated 1433, is a defeasance of a writing obligatory. made tinder the "Statute Merchant" to secure the performance of certain covenant, in a marriage contract. It is quite likely that during this transitional period
the single instrument came to be known as the "single bond," and that this name clung
to it for a long time after the two-instrument form became obsolete. This may well
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about the same time that the mortgage in the form of a conveyance
with a condition subsequent begins to be incorporated in one single
instrument. .
The reason for the adoption by Englishmen of the two instrument device in the case of conditional obligations was the same as
that which, as we have seen above, prompted the Jews to develop it,
namely the rule against penalties. Whether dirctly influenced by the
Hebrew doctrine of "asmakhta" or not, 37 the rule against penalties
be the explanation of the term "single bond" in Act x, Scene 3, of The Merchant of
Venice. Pollock and Maitland interpret this term as meaning a bond without a condition or a penalty. In vol. 2 at 225, n. 2, they say: "Not one of the commentators, so far
as we know, has rightly understood this term in the place where Shakespeare has made
it classical. . . . Shylock first offers to take a bond without a penalty, and then
adds.the fantastic penalty of the pound of flesh as a jesting afterthought." Why Shylock should'have first offered to take a bond without any penalty at all, when the usual
practice in those days was to name an amount equal to the amount of the principal
obligation as a penalty in case of default, is not quite clear. It would seem therefore
that the writer's explanation of the term is more in accord with the Shakespearean
text. Shylock first offered to take the standard bond with the usual penalty, and then
changed the penalty to a pound of flesh.
37. The influence of the Hebrew doctrine of "asmakhta" upon the development of
the rule against penalties in English law may have been indirect. It may have been
exercised through the devices which the Jews used in their transactions among them.
selves for the purpose of qvercoming the difficulty of "asinakhta," and which were
adopted by Englishmen. - In all of the available Hebrew documents, evidencing transactions between Jew and Jew in 13th century England, there is not a single one in
which provision is made for a penalty payable to the obligee. Instead-,these documents contain provisions for penalties in favor of the King, the Queen, and, at least
in one document, there is even a provision for a penalty payable to Earl Richard, the
King's brother.

See DAvIs, HEBREW DEEDS, Nos. 23, 54, 6s, 69, 87, 105, 128, ia'; see

also Calendar of The Plea Rolls of The Exchequer of The Jews, v. 2, p. 237, and v.
3, PP- 31, 53, 307. Occasionally, too, there is provision for a penalty payable to some
charity, such as a synagogue or a Jewish cemetery. DAVIs, Nos. 47, 67. This device,
like many others used in connection with writings obligatory, was apparently copied
by Englishmen from the Jews. There are numerous instances of the use of this device
by Englishmen in the 13th century. See e. g., Calendar of The Close Rolls, 1256-59,
P. 493; 1259-61, pp. 474-75; 1272-79, pp. 254, 343-344, 413.
That this device originated with the Jews can hardly be doubted, for with them
it filled a definite need, namely, that of overcoming the difficulty of the doctrine of
"asmakhta," which rendered all penalties payable to the obligee invalid. The Jewish
obligee, who could not have the full benefit of a penalty payable to himself, endeavored
to have at least a provision which would serve to deter the obligor from defaulting.
He therefore made'the penalty payable to the King, who could be relied on to collect
it, or to a charity to which the doctrine of "asmakhta" is not applicable. It should be
borne in mind that this doctrine has nothing to do with the laws of usury. These laws
deal with what is permissible and what is not, while the doctrine of "asmakhta" deals
with what is valid and enforceable and what is not. Usury is a sin; a provision for
a penalty, under Hebrew law, is not. It just is unenforceable. The penalty clause in
the Hebrew documents cited in this note was thus designed to remedy a difficulty created by a doctrine which was peculiarly Hebrew in origin and development, and just
as the difficulty was of the Jew's own making, so was the remedy. The provision for
a penalty payable to the King is also found among the Jews of Spain at a much earlier
time than the 13th century. In a Hebrew deed of conveyance, made at Leon, Spain,
and dated 1053, there is a provision in the warranty clause to the effect that if the
grantor fails to warrant, he is to pay ioo denarim to the King. The French translation of this provision, given in 4 REVUE DEs ETUDES JUIVES 227-229, where the document was first published, reads as follows: "Et si je suis emp~ch6 de repousser et
rendre vaine une contestation et riclamation quelconque concernant cette vente, je
payerai en cette ville la valeur de cette vigne sans aucun retard, et s'il avait retard, je
payerai au roi cent deniers." See also Sefer Hashtaroth (Formbook) of Rabbi Judah
Barzillai (1ith century, Spain), form No. 72, where a similar provision is found. In
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in English law seems to have been first extensively invoked against
Jewish creditors. In the Close Rolls of Henry III and Edw. I we
find a number of cases in which royal equity is exercised in favor of
Christian debtors, relieving them from "penalties and usuries" to Jewish creditors."8 The terms "usuries" and "penalties" always go together in these royal mandates.
The Jewish creditor could not even always take shelter under the
form of an absolute obligation with a conditional release. Form readily yielded to substance where the Jew was involved. Thus in the
Close Rolls of Edw. 1 39 we find that by royal mandate to the Justices
of the Jews the Convent of St. Mary is to be acquitted from "pains
and usuries" to the Jews. In the same mandate the King orders the
Justices to cause an inquest to be made as to how much money was
received by the Convent from the Jews. Apparently, the penalties were
disguised in the form of an absolute obligation, and the King ordered
to disregard the form and ascertain the true amount of the loan. Some
interesting entries bearing on this point are found in the Calendar
of The Plea Rolls of The Exchequer of The Jews. "At the suit of
Th. comes Deudoni Cryspin with Chirographs etc., to account, and
demands of Th., by two charters which are in the King's treasury for
his talliage, £22 with £20 interest. Defence, that the claim is unlawful, for that one of the charters was only by way of penalty, and is
quit by the other, pursuant to a starr which is in the hands of J., clerk
of the Chirograph chest of York." 40 In another case 41 the Christian
debtor alleged that the Jew, by his starr, granted that he, the debtor,
be quit of a charter of £40 upon payment of £24 on or before a certain date, and of a charter for £30 upon payment of £i5. And since
the King granted that all penalties and usuries should cease, "he is
not bound to answer touching the sum contained in the said charters
which is, as it were, penalty."
this form there is also a provision that the payment of the penalty shall not discharge
the obligor of his principal obligation. The last provision is also found in all of the
above Hebrew documents from Angevin England, in which there is a penalty clause.
Through the frequent use of this device by Englishmen the notion may have gradually gained ground among them that a provision for a penalty payable to the obligee
is not valid, and that"it savors of usury. The device may thus have preceded the rule
among Englishmen, and may have contributed to its adoption by them. Some support
for this supposition may be seen in the fact that for some time there seems to have
been hesitation among Englishmen as to whether or not penalties were enforceable.
See documents cited note 32 mspra.
38. See Calendar of The Close Rolls, 1264-68, pp. 265-66, 305, 403; 1268-72, pp.
346, 370, 583-84; 1272-79. pp. 170, 177, 27T, 286.
39. Id., 1272-79, p. 177.
40. Calendar of The Plea Rolls of The Exchequer bf The Jews, v. 2, p. 295.

41. Id.. v. 3, PP. 167-68.

COMMON LAW MORTGAGE AND CONDITIONAL BOND

It thus appears that already during the reign of Henry III penalties were thought to be akin to usuries and to belong to the same
class. It is true that for some time it was apparently thought that only
penalties growing out of loan of money partook of the nature of usury,
and that clauses providing for what we might call "liquidated damages" in case of breach, in contracts arising out of transactions other
than a loan of money, did not come within the prohibition of usury.
Thus we find during the reign of Edw. I a number of recognizances
in the nature of liquidated damages in case of failure on the part of
the obligor to perform certain undertakings, as, for example, in case the
obligor fails to enfeoff the obligee of certain land,4 2 or in case the
obligor's son, a minor, upon reaching maturity disaffirms his marriage
to the obligee's daughter. 43 However, towards the close of the same
reign conveyancers seem to have begun to doubt the validity of such
clauses, and the conditional obligation in the form of an absolute recognizance and a defeasance thereof begins to take the place of the
provision for liquidated damages. By the middle of the 14th century,
as we have seen above, this becomes the universal method of effecting
4
a conditional obligation.
It should be noted here that the employment of a third party, the
"equal hand," as a depositary, is a prominent feature in the 14th century transactions between Christian and Christian, just as it is in the
numerous 13th century transactions between Jew and Jew and Jew
and Christian. In a case decided in 1313 the headnote reads as follows:
"Debt, where the original bond was unconditional, and there
was an indented conditioned penalty bond [un endenture condicionnel de couste], both of which were delivered to one G. The
condition was satisfied and G died. The bond came into the hands
of his executors, one of whom was one of the parties to whom
the bond was made; and because the defendant could not deny
the unconditional bond the court gave judgment that the executor
should recover the debt, though he had only obtained possession
of the bond as executor, and notwithstanding the fact that the
defendant had a bill of detinue claiming the same bond and others
pending against him in the same eyre." 4
To return to the conveyance with the condition subsequent. The
evidence is quite abundant that this device was used extensively by
Close Rolls, 1272-79, p. 430.
43. Id. at 41; see also Eyre of Kent, 6 & 7 Edw. II, v.
44. See note 34 supra.
45. Eyre of Kent, 6 & 7 Edw. II, v. 2, p. 1g.
42. Calendar of The

2, p.

27.
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the Jews during the middle ages in exactly the same manner and for
the same reason as the absolute obligation with the conditional release
were used by them. Conveyance and defeasance were usually incorporated in two separate instruments and both instruments were delivered to a third party, to be returned to the mortgagor in case of payment of the debt on or before the due date, or turned over to the mortgagee in case of non-payment. A case involving two such documents
is discussed in a responsum by Nachmanides. 4' The two documents
were delivered to a third party, to be held by him for a period of four
years, the term of the mortgage. The argument was advanced by the
mortgagor-grantor that the deed was not valid, since it represented
an attempt to convey the property in futuro. This argument was dismissed by the rabbi on the ground that the deed effected an immediate
conveyance, subject to defeasance within the time specified in the defeasance instrument, and was not a conveyance in futuro. Another
case involving two such documents delivered to a third party, is discussed in a responsum of about the same time, written by Rabbi Solomon ben Adreth 47 (1235-1310).
Earlier, in the 12th century, an interesting question arose in connection with such conditional conveyances by way of security in a case
decided by Rabbi Abraham ben David.4 8 In this case, as in the cases
just cited, the deed f conveyance was delivered to a third party to
be held by him during the term of the mortgage. Before the end of
the term the grantee-mortgagee conveyed his interest in the property to
another. When, after the expiration of the term, the mortgagee's
grantee asserted his claim to the property, the mortgagor resisted this
claim, contending that the conveyance by the mortgagee was void. He
supported his contention by the argument that at the time of the
attempted conveyance the mortgagee had no interest in the property
which he could validly convey, since his interest was not to become
absolute before the term of the mortgage was over. The conveyance by
the mortgagee, he argued, was in the nature of an attempted transfer
of future acquisitions which, according to Hebrew law, is not valid.
The rabbi decided in favor of the mortgagee's grantee, holding that
46. Responsa of Rabbi Solomon ben Adreth (Rashba), Attributed to Rabbi Moses
ben Nachman (Ramban), No. zz. This is a collection of responsa which were erroneously thought to have been written by Ramban. It was later discovered that their
author, for the most part, was not Ramban, but Rashba.. There are,* however, some
responsa in this collection which were penned by the former, and the responsum cited
in the text is one of them. Rashba himself in one of his signed responsa refers to this
one as"having emanated from Ramban. See Responsa of Rabbi Solomon ben Adreth,
-No.:9x6.(Lemberg, x811).
47. Responsa of Rabbi Solomon ben Adreth sub noynine Toldoth Adam, No. 188;
see also No. 2W for a similar case.
48. Cited in Tur, Choshen Mishpat, ch. r4, sec. z3.

COMMON LAIV MORTGAGE AND CONDITIONAL BOND

193

at the time of the delivery of the deed to the third party the mortgagee
acquired an immediate and present interest in the property, subject only
to defeasance upon repayment by the mortgagor of the money advanced
to him by the mortgagee within the period agreed on, and that therefore the conveyance by the mortgagee within that period was valid,
although subject to the same defeasance.
Still earlier, in the i ith century, the conditional conveyance by
49
way of security is mentioned in the responsa of Rabbi Isaac Alfassi.

Finally, it should be borne in mind that the doctrine of "asmakhta" is
discussed in the Talmud in connection with a mortgage, and that the
rule is laid down there that a forfeiture clause is not valid, and that only
a present absolute conveyance with a provision for repurchase or defeasance is valid. So much for conditional conveyances by way of
security used by the Jews in countries other than England.
As for England, the evidence is rather indirect, but no less convincing, nevertheless. In a 13th century Hebrew document, 10 evidencing a sale of a house by one Jew to another, we find the grantor making
a representation under oath that he had made neither a deed of mortgage of the property, nor a deed of conveyance by way of security for
a debt, previously to the conveyance attested by the document. Again,
there are some entries on the Close Rolls

51

to the effect that a charter

of feoffment was delivered by a Christian to the Chirographers to be
kept in the "Jewish Chest". In these cases the charter was apparently
delivered by way of security for a loan. Also, in a schedule of chattels
which belonged to two deceased Jews, and which were found in the
London Chest we find the following item: "Hamo and Ursell have io
charters of feoffment of land." 62 These charters, too, were apparently
kept in the chest as security for loans. Finally, in the Mandate of The
King Touching Lands and Fees of The Jews in Englvid, 3 dated 1271,
by which the Jews were deprived of the right of holding freeholds
"inmanors, lands, tenements, fees, rents or tenures of any kind whatsoever by charter, grant, feoffment, confirmation, or any other kind
of obligation," it is stated that "touching lands and tenures, however,
of which Jews were enfeoffed before the present statute and which they
now hold, it is our pleasure that such infeudations be altogether annulled, and that those lands and tenements remain to the Christians
who demised them to the Jews; so nevertheless that the Christians
49. No. 2M (Leghorn, 1781).
50. DAVIS, op. cit. supra note 37, No. 58.
51. Calendar of The Close Rolls, 1247-51, p. 308; 1254-56, pp. 424-25.
52. V. x, p. 68 (1244).
53. Select Pleas, etc., from The Exchequer of The Jews (xgoI) is Selden Society
Publ. LI-LIV.

194

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

discharge what is due to the Jews on account of the money or chattels
contained in their charters or chirographs, and given to them by the
Jews for such grant of feoffment, without interest [sine usura]." The
whole tenor of the above mandate or statute, and particularly the provision that the Christian grantors are to "discharge what is due to the
Jews . . . without interest," clearly indicates that these transactions
originated in loans, that the charters of feoffment were given to the
Jews by way of security, and that they became absolute upon default
by the Christian debtors. With regard to the above statute it might
be added parenthetically that had the royal sense of justice been equally
outraged at the oppression of the debtor class by the creditor class when
the latter were Christians as when they were Jews, it might not have
taken English courts several centuries before they evolved the doctrine
of the equity of redemption.
To sum up. The conditional conveyance by way of security had
been in use by the Jews for a long time prior to their settlement in
England, and was used by them in England in their transactions with
Christians. The technical device by which the conditional conveyance
was effected was, in every detail, identical with the classical English
mortgage in its original form, namely, two separate instruments were
used and a third party was employed as a depositary. A device similar in conception and design to the conditional conveyance was used
by the Jews during the middle ages in England and elsewhere for the
purpose of effecting conditional obligations. This device, too, was in
every respect identical with the common law conditional bond in the
earlier stage of its development. Both of these devices were developed
by the Jews for the purpose of evading a certain rule of Hebrew law
which is similar to the rule against penalties in English law. The Jews
introduced the business of money-lending on a large scale in England,
and with it the means by which this business was carried on. When
Englishmen learned the business of money-lending from the Jew they
adopted his methods and devices, outstanding examples of which are
the conditional conveyance by way of security and the conditional bond
which have survived to our own day.

